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Abstract: We examine the impact of clients’ tax enforcement on financial statement auditors. In 
a regression discontinuity design, we exploit the firm-registration-date-based application of a 
new rule that assigns firms to two different tax enforcement regimes. Our analysis implies that 
auditors exert less effortevident in lower audit fees and shorter audit report lagswhen their 
clients are monitored by the more stringent tax authority. In results supporting that audit 
quality improves in this situation despite the fall in auditor effort, we report that clients subject 
to tougher tax enforcement exhibit a lower incidence of accounting restatements and tax-related 
restatements. Additionally, we find no evidence of impaired auditor independence evident in 
the informativeness of auditors’ modified opinions. Finally, we document that clients 
undergoing stricter tax enforcement are assigned less-experienced partners, suggesting that tax 
enforcement enables audit firms to optimize client-partner matching. Collectively, our research 
suggests that tax authority oversight engenders a positive externality by improving external 
audit efficiency. 
 
Keywords: tax enforcement, audit fees, audit effort, auditor-client matching. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the importance of corporate tax enforcement to the behavior of financial 
statement auditors. Research on tax enforcement has long been focused on its impacts on tax 
compliance and revenue collection (Slemrod 2019). More recently, the effects that tax 
enforcement may have on taxpayers’ behaviors other than tax compliance have attracted 
considerable interest in research and policy circles (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman 2008; Hanlon et 
al. 2014; Gallemore and Jacob 2019). In this study, we consider the audit market, which is often 
neglected in the formation of economic and tax policies, to be a potentially important factor in 
gauging the benefits and costs of tax enforcement (Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996; Nessa et al. 
2019).3 Although the purpose of tax enforcement is not to improve accounting transparency, tax 
authority monitoring of firms’ tax returns may have spillover benefits to the financial reporting 
numbers given the considerable overlap between the book and tax systems. Indeed, corporate 
financial statements are the starting point in reconciling book income to taxable income. Despite 
the close relationship between the two systems, prior research does not explicitly evaluate the 
role that monitoring by tax authorities plays. From a policy perspective, shedding light on the 
impact of tax enforcement on external auditors may enhance our understanding of the net 
benefits of tax enforcement.  
The link between tax enforcement and auditor behavior remains unclear ex ante. On one 
hand, clients’ tax positions are naturally subject to closer scrutiny when tax enforcement is 
stricter, increasing the likelihood that the tax authority will challenge a client’s tax position. 
From the external auditor’s standpoint, this higher likelihood engenders a higher risk of 
                                                          
3 In evaluating tax enforcement activities, policy makers weigh the benefits of increased tax revenue 
against the costs, which typically include the direct expenditures on tax authority personnel and the tax 
compliance cost borne by taxpayers (Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996; Hoopes et al. 2012; Nessa et al. 2019). 
We broaden this focus by analyzing whether strict tax authority monitoring engenders a positive 
externality in the form of improving external audit efficiency. 
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financial restatement (Hanlon et al. 2012; Donohoe and Knechel 2014).4 For example, in its 2016 
tax audit of Tibet Huayu Mining Company, China’s State Administration of Taxation (SAT) 
detected that the firm under-reported its financial income by almost 40 million Chinese Yuan 
(equivalent to US$6 million). This reinforces that strong tax enforcement exposes the auditor to 
higher risk of audit deficiency and reputation damage.5 In addition to tax positions, stricter tax 
enforcement will also induce auditors to focus intently on constraining upward earnings 
management since large book-tax gaps can attract tax authority scrutiny (Mills 1998). 6 
Consequently, the auditor will respond by charging a higher fee given that she must spend 
more time auditing the client’s tax positions as well as its financial reporting. Moreover, it is 
important to stress that the higher fee may also reflect a risk premium since the additional audit 
risk arising from stricter tax enforcement cannot be completely mitigated by working harder on 
the engagement. In fact, income tax accounts are frequently considered the most complicated to 
audit (Badertscher et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2012). Nonetheless, despite auditors expending 
more effort, income tax-related issues still account for 12.8% of all restatements, ranking as the 
third most commonly listed reason for restatements according to Audit Analytics (2016). It 
follows that audit fees are higher when clients are monitored by a tougher tax authority. 
                                                          
4  In the U.S., tax-related issues are among the most frequently raised issues in Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections (Drake et al. 2016; Acito et al. 2018). 
5 Reflecting audit failure, restatements are costly to both firms and their auditors (e.g., Cao et al. 2012; 
Mande and Son 2013; Hennes et al. 2014; Irani et al. 2015; Christensen et al. 2016; Aobdia 2019). 
6 Supporting both tax advisors’ (Cloyd 1995) and corporate managers’ (Cloyd et al. 1996) perceptions that 
tax audit costs fall with book-tax conformity, prior research implies that narrowing the difference 
between their financial reporting and taxable incomes enables firms to deflect the attention of tax 
authorities (e.g., Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000), including in China (e.g., Li et al. 2019). It is also 
important to stress that although some prior research implies that auditors are more concerned about 
preventing clients from managing their book earnings upward (Nelson et al., 2002; Lennox et al., 2014), 
other evidence suggests that they strive to constrain both forms (e.g., Myers et al., 2003; Francis and Yu, 
2009), reinforcing that both external auditors and tax authorities are eager to curb attempts to manipulate 
earnings downward.. 
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On the other hand, firms’ tax aggressiveness and financial reporting risks may subside 
under stricter tax enforcement that deters firms from pursuing tax aggressive strategies 
(Hoopes et al. 2012; Hanlon et al. 2014). This, in turn, results in fewer expected tax-related 
restatements, alleviating auditor concerns over this type of audit failure and deficiency. 
Alternatively, holding their strategies constant, firms in this situation have stronger incentives 
to diligently prepare for potential tax audits by committing more resources to researching and 
documenting their tax positions. Auditors, anticipating the lower tax aggressiveness and 
financial reporting risk that accompanies closer monitoring by the tax authority, will be less 
concerned about the quality of the client’s tax positions. This implies that auditors will exert less 
effort evident in charging lower fees when their clients experience stricter tax enforcement.  
Moreover, corporate tax enforcement may be irrelevant to auditor behavior. Set against 
prior research implying that tax authority resources or tax audit certainty do not perceptibly 
impact the tax positions that firms undertake (Ayers et al. 2019; Nessa et al. 2019), auditors may 
conclude that differential tax enforcement intensity does not materially impact detection risk 
and their clients’ behavior. Given the tension stemming from the competing incentives at work, 
it is difficult to form a directional prediction on the role that corporate tax enforcement plays in 
shaping audit fees.  
Our empirical analysis takes advantage of a quasi-experimental setting afforded by an 
unanticipated tax collection arrangement. On January 16, 2002, the SAT, China’s national tax 
authority, announced a change in the tax collection process such that firms registered after 
January 1, 2002 (hereafter, the cut-off date) would become subject to SAT monitoring, whereas 
firms registered before the cut-off date remain under the administration of the Local Taxation 
Bureau (LTB). This arrangement was retroactively applied to all firms registered on or after 
January 1, 2002. Generally, the SAT is perceived to enforce higher levels of tax compliance than 
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the LTB because the SAT is under the direct administration of the central government, whereas 
the LTB falls under the management of a local or provincial government.7 Consequently, this 
policy created a discontinuity in tax enforcement by the date of new firm registration. Given 
that the new tax collector arrangement was unanticipated and that the firm registration date 
was not subject to manipulation, this setting allows us to examine the impact of corporate tax 
enforcement severity on external audits using a regression discontinuity (RD) framework. We 
focus on a group of newly registered firms established one year before and after the policy cut-
off date. Diverging from the general pre-post (e.g., difference-in-differences) designs, the RD 
design establishes causality by comparing firms that are just above the eligibility threshold for a 
certain policy (treatment) with those that are just below it (control). Lee and Lemieux (2010) 
suggest that casual inferences from the RD design are more credible than and superior to other 
identification strategies. 8  Helping to justify our empirical strategy, extensive research in 
economics relies on date-based RD designs (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
Although the RD design has its merits, a crucial validity assumption underlying this 
technique is that the running variable is not subject to manipulation (Gow et al. 2016). In our 
setting, this assumption may be violated if firms anticipated the policy and responded by 
advancing their firm registration date ahead of the cut-off date. To help dispel the concern that 
this assumption is violated, we conduct two analyses. First, we check whether firms may have 
anticipated the new tax collector arrangement prior to the official announcement date by 
searching for press releases and news articles on this issue. We do not find any indications of 
potential leakage or anticipation of the arrangement. Second, after plotting the bi-monthly 
                                                          
7 We explain later in the paper how we follow prior research to empirically validate this assumption (Lin 
et al. 2014; Lin et al. 2018; Li et al. 2019).  
8 Gow et al. (2016) stress that difference-in-differences designs based on exogenous shocks often suffer 
from problems such as non-random assignment of treatments and correlation with unobserved factors. 
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number of new firms registered from January 2000 to December 2003, we observe no visible 
discontinuity in the number of new firms registered just before and just after the cut-off date. 
Reassuringly, this evidence is inconsistent with the possibility that firms strategically selected 
their registration dates in response to the new tax collector arrangement, which is constructive 
for validating that the RD design assumption is defensible in our setting.  
To analyze our research question, we begin by comparing the audit fees of firms 
administered by the SAT (i.e., firms that registered on or after the cut-off date) to those 
administered by the LTB (i.e., firms that registered before the cut-off date). To allow sufficient 
time for firms registered in the two years around the cut-off date (i.e., 2001 and 2002) to become 
publicly listed firms, our sample period starts in 2008 and ends in 2015; in this timeframe, the  
tax collectors of publicly listed firms remain unchanged since their establishment.9 Our results 
suggest that auditors charge lower fees to clients administered by the SAT than they charge 
clients administered by the LTB, consistent with the narrative that auditors perceive that clients’ 
accounting transparency improves under the stricter tax enforcement imposed by the SAT. This 
evidence is robust to controlling for a registration date trend (and its higher order polynomials), 
to restricting the sample to a narrower window around the cut-off date to potentially improve 
identification (Saez et al. 2012), and to using matched-sample designs. 
After establishing the casual effect of tax enforcement on audit fees, we examine its 
impact on the length of the audit report lag (or audit delay) to help empirically clarify whether 
the audit fee results stem from reduced audit effort or a lower risk premium. We find that firms 
                                                          
9 In China, a newly registered firm is required to operate for at least three years before becoming eligible 
to undergo an initial public offering. We choose to begin our sample in 2008 because of the change in 
corporate tax rates and the adoption of a new accounting standard in 2007. The results are similar if we 
use an extended sample beginning in 2005, the earliest year possible for the newly registered firms in 
2002 to become publicly listed companies. 
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under the SAT have significantly shorter audit report lags, implying that stricter tax 
enforcement induces auditors to expend less effort. This result also suggests that the decrease in 
audit fees is not solely driven by risk premium compensation.  
We also examine whether the lower auditor effort comes at the expense of their audit 
quality. Our results imply that tougher tax enforcement leads to fewer accounting restatements 
and tax-related restatements. Collectively, our evidence suggests that tax enforcement reduces 
audit effort (evident in audit fees and the audit report lag) and improves audit quality, 
supporting the intuition that audits become more efficient when tax enforcement is stricter.10  
To further validate that tax enforcement intensity is the channel underlying the observed 
results, we identify two settings where the spillover effects of tax enforcement on auditors are 
more salient: (i) when SAT enforcement is stronger than LTB’s at the local office level; and (ii) 
when the auditor has industry expertise. We expect that the spillover effects are stronger when 
auditors have a better understanding of the tax monitoring strength and its implications for 
their clients.11 Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the impact of tax enforcement on 
audit fees, audit report lag, and restatements are all concentrated when tax enforcement is 
stricter at the local office level or the auditor has industry expertise.  
 We conduct two placebo tests to provide additional assurance that our observed results 
reflect the differences in tax enforcement levels between the two tax collectors. First, we 
hypothetically move the policy cut-off time backward (forward) by one year to January 2001 
(January 2003) and re-estimate the empirical analysis between firms registered in 2000 and 2001 
                                                          
10 Additionally, we find that audit reports remain equally informative for both types of clients, helping to 
dispel the alternative explanation that impaired auditor independence is behind our evidence on this 
front (e.g., Geiger and Rama 2003). 
11 Both SAT and LTB operate local offices across provinces in China. Accordingly, LTB is not more 
geographically proximate to firms than the SAT is (Kubick et al. 2017). 
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(2002 and 2003). Reassuringly, we do not find any perceptible differences in the outcome 
variables between the two groups, which are both administered by the LTB or SAT. Second, we 
re-run our tests after isolating Shanghai firms and central state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a 
group of firms not affected by the new tax collector arrangement because the income tax for 
Shanghai firms is collected by the Shanghai Municipal Tax Service and central SOEs are always 
subject to SAT monitoring. Consistent with expectations, the results suggest that auditor 
behavior relating to Shanghai firms or central SOEs registered in 2001 and 2002 do not exhibit 
discernible differences during our estimation period. Evidence from these placebo tests is 
difficult to reconcile with the competing explanation that other economic conditions 
surrounding the policy cut-off date are spuriously responsible for our core results. 
To shed light on the impact on audit firm level resource allocation, we analyze audit 
partner assignment decisions. Our results suggest that audit firms assign more experienced 
partners to clients monitored by the less stringent authority, implying that audit firms perceive 
those clients as requiring tougher monitoring of the financial reporting process. Evidence from 
examining client acceptance decisions and auditor switches suggests that Big Four auditors 
consider the tax authority identity in relying on a portfolio approach to managing audit risk.  
We make several contributions to prior evidence by analyzing auditors’ strategic 
responses to variation in corporate tax enforcement levels. First, we extend research examining 
economic outcomes stemming from corporate tax enforcement to include an important third-
party: financial statement auditors. Prior work mainly focuses on the role that corporate tax 
enforcement plays in shaping taxpayers’ behaviors (e.g., Hoopes et al. 2012; Hanlon et al. 2014; 
Lin et al. 2018). In contrast, we find that the impact of tax enforcement can extend to other 
market participants. Our evidence implies that audit quality improves under stricter tax 
authority monitoring in that clients have fewer accounting and tax-related restatements despite 
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that both audit fees and the audit report lag fall in this situation. Altogether, these results 
suggest that audit efficiency rises with tax enforcement severity. At the audit firm level, we 
document that corporate tax enforcement enables audit firms to better allocate resources by 
optimizing the matching of clients and partners. Accordingly, we respond to calls for research 
on the determinants of partner assignment policies, including the role that clients’ propensity to 
manipulate their earnings plays (Lennox and Wu 2018). In short, our results suggest that 
corporate tax enforcement generates a positive externality for the audit market. Consequently, 
omitting the spillover benefits from tax authority cross-monitoring would underestimate the 
wider impact of strict tax enforcement. Our results have major implications for practitioners, 
standard-setters, and regulators striving to deepen their understanding of the forces that affect 
accounting transparency and audit quality, as well as for regulators and policy makers in the 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of tax enforcement (Mills 2019). 
Second, we advance our understanding of how auditors respond to tax enforcement 
intensity and to clients’ tax risk in general. Although prior work analyzes the association 
between audit fees and clients’ tax aggressiveness (Hanlon et al. 2012; Donohoe and Knechel 
2014), audit research remains silent on the role that tax enforcement plays. We triangulate our 
audit fee results with evidence on various facets of audit inputs and outcomes, including the 
audit report lag, accounting and tax restatements, the accuracy of modified audit opinions, and 
audit firms’ decisions on the matching of clients with partners. Our results on audit firms’ use 
of resources also enrich our understanding of the real effects of the interplay between financial 
reporting and tax enforcement, a non-reporting institution on auditors (Leuz and Wysocki 
2016). Collectively, our findings paint a fairly comprehensive picture of the causal effect of 
corporate tax enforcement on external auditors. 
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Finally, we report causal evidence on the importance of corporate tax enforcement to 
auditor behavior using a novel setting involving a new rule that exogenously assigns firms into 
one of two different tax enforcement regimes. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) advise researchers to 
examine non-traditional settings that permit tighter research designs that are not feasible using 
U.S. data. We initiate research on this regime shift in the tax collector arrangement in China, 
which represents an opportune testing ground that facilitates drawing causal inferences on the 
impact of tax enforcement. Importantly, examining the role that tax enforcement plays in 
shaping auditor behavior is particularly advantageous in this setting because auditor-provided 
tax services (APTS) are prohibited in China. 12  The provision of APTS complicates the 
interpretation of results because it is an endogenous choice that has been shown to affect 
various dimensions of audit as well as tax outcomes.13 In another upside, auditor discipline 
stemming from litigation institutions is minimal in China such that we circumvent its nuisance 
impact on audit pricing (e.g., He et al. 2016), which facilitates isolating whether auditor effort is 
sensitive to tax enforcement. Our focus on non-state-run firms alleviates external validity 
concerns that our findings are less relevant to settings where the government plays a smaller 
role in the economy. Finally, additional analysis implies that the advantages of studying our 
                                                          
12 More generally, Chinese firms purchase hardly any non-audit services from their auditors. 
13 In terms of tax outcomes, prior research has documented that APTS are related to increased earnings 
management via tax accounts (Cook et al. 2008), improved estimation of tax reserves (Gleason and Mills 
2011), and more tax avoidance (McGuire et al. 2012; Klassen et al. 2016). Another stream of empirical 
research generally finds that APTS are associated with better audit quality stemming from knowledge 
spillovers, including improved accuracy of going-concern opinions and internal control (Robinson 2008; 
De Simone et al. 2015), as well as a reduced likelihood of restatements and loss avoidance (Kinney et al. 
2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011). The prohibition of APTS in China significantly alleviates concerns 
that the results are contaminated by any of those effects. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3487193
 10 
 
research question using the China setting do not come at the expense of external validity, which 
provides some assurance that our results are generalizable to environments outside of China.14  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the evolution of the 
institutions governing corporate tax enforcement in China and develops the hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the empirical design and the data. Section 4 outlines the main evidence, while 
Section 5 covers the results from additional analyses. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Tax collection in China, before and after 2002 
In China, the collection of corporate income taxes is administered by two tax authorities: 
The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the Local Taxation Bureau (LTB). The SAT is 
responsible for central state-owned firms (central SOEs), while the LTB collects income taxes 
from local state-owned firms (local SOEs) and non-state-owned firms in their jurisdictions (SAT 
1995). Originating with the fiscal reform in 1994, this tax collection arrangement was designed 
to establish an efficient fiscal allocation mechanism enhancing the tax revenue collection and 
power distribution of the central government. At the local level, this collection arrangement also 
allows local governments to match their expenditures with their local tax revenue (Qian and 
Roland 1998). Officials at the SAT are appointed by the central government to handle its tax 
enforcement and tax collection, whereas LTB officials are appointed and supervised by the local 
                                                          
14 In untabulated tests using a large sample of Chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2007 where tax 
audit rate data are available, we find strong evidence that tax audit likelihood is associated with lower tax 
avoidance (Hoopes et al. 2012) and that tax aggressiveness is associated with higher audit fees (Donohoe 
and Knechel 2014). This associative evidence reinforces prior U.S.-based research and suggests that both 
the deterrence effects of tax enforcement and auditor behavior exhibit a large degree of similarity 
between the U.S. and China, lending some support for the external validity of our results. Nonetheless, it 
is important to exercise caution when interpreting the empirical relevance of results from any single-
country study for other jurisdictions.  
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government for tax collection at the local level (Tang et al. 2017).15 The SAT also provides 
guidance and coordination on taxation issues with the LTB and monitors the LTB as necessary.16 
 In 2002, China adopted a new arrangement for corporate income tax collection such that 
all firms registered on or after the cut-off date of January 1, 2002 became subject to the SAT’s 
administration, whereas firms registered by December 31, 2001 follow the old regime by 
remaining under the administration of the LTB (SAT 2002). The rationale behind this policy 
shift was the central government’s interest in enhancing its ability to fund national programs, 
ranging from infrastructure projects to initiatives intended to improve the financial situation of 
low-income provinces (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). This new arrangement for 
administering corporate income tax collection allows us to compare firms that differ in tax 
enforcement due to their assigned tax collector (SAT or LTB) and share similar characteristics in 
other dimensions while holding constant other aspects of tax laws, including tax bases and 
statutory tax rates. Accordingly, we exploit this strong quasi-experimental setting to identify the 
impact of tax enforcement by comparing firms subject to the administration of the SAT (i.e., 
those that registered on or after 2002 under the new arrangement) and firms under the 
administration of the LTB (i.e., those registered as of 2001 under the former arrangement). 
2.2 Prior research on the role of clients’ tax aggressiveness in audit risk model 
 In their comprehensive review of empirical audit research, DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
consider four strategies that auditors apply in response to client risk and client complexity: (1) 
exert greater audit effort and increase audit quality to reduce risk under the production view of 
                                                          
15 Tang et al. (2017) find that local government ownership creates a conflict for the local tax authority that 
leads to local government-owned firms enjoying lax tax enforcement, resulting in local SOEs avoiding 
more taxes. We explain later that we exclude these firms from our analysis to improve identification. 
16 In China, all firms have the same December 31 fiscal year end and firms are required to issue their 
annual reports before April 30. The deadline for filing corporate tax returns is May 31 (or April 30 before 
2008) of the same year. 
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the audit process (e.g., Simunic 1980); (2) charge a fee premium to compensate for bearing the 
risk (e.g., Bell et al. 2008); (3) manage the client portfolio to control overall risk exposure (e.g., 
Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Johnstone and Bedard 2004); and (4) lobby for litigation relief 
(Geiger and Raghunandan 2001).17 For tax enforcement to affect auditor behavior, it should 
shape the inherent risk of the audit engagement. However, prior research on the role that tax 
enforcement plays in the audit risk model remains scarce.  
The complexity and judgment involved in the estimation of tax expenses and the 
difficulties in understanding the tax positions of firms render tax accounts a major source of 
financial reporting risk (Badertscher et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2012). Issues surrounding 
accounting for income taxes are often cited as the cause of financial restatements (Ernst and 
Young 2016). Hanlon et al. (2012) find a significant positive association between book-tax 
differences and audit fees, and the results are stronger for firms that might have managed 
earnings as compared to tax-avoiding firms. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) find that auditors 
charge higher fees to more tax-aggressive clients, which they attribute to auditors incorporating 
a risk premium into audit pricing, even with additional effort considered, as tax-aggressive 
clients expose the auditor to heightened litigation, regulatory, and reputational costs. Overall, 
prior evidence lends support to the notion that auditors impose a fee premium on more tax-
aggressive clients to reflect their greater risk and complexity. 
  
                                                          
17  Extensive prior research implies that strict investor protection institutions motivate auditors to 
constrain firms from excessively distorting their reported earnings (Guedhami and Pittman 2006; Francis 
and Wang 2008). However, it is important to stress that auditor discipline stemming from civil litigation 
forces is minimal in China. He et al. (2016) explain that although investors in China are entitled to recover 
losses incurred when auditors issue an unqualified opinion on materially deficient financial statements, 
lawsuits against auditors almost never succeed there; i.e., in our setting, litigation incentives play almost 
no role in inducing auditors to closely monitor the financial reporting process. 
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2.3 The impact of tax enforcement on auditor behavior 
At this stage, the importance of tax enforcement to auditor behavior remains unclear 
because extant audit research seldom considers the role that tax authority monitoring plays. In 
analytical research, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2019) model the impact of tougher regulatory 
enforcement (e.g., SEC oversight) on financial reporting quality and audit quality. Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2019) demonstrate that the link between enforcement and audit effort hinges on 
enforcement intensity. Audit effort subsides in a strong enforcement regime since this lowers 
anticipated earnings management, which, in turn, engenders lower audit effort. However, if the 
enforcement regime is lax, auditors work harder to protect audit quality. It remains an empirical 
question whether external auditors are sensitive to variation in enforcement intensity.  
In the presence of stricter tax enforcement, clients’ tax positions will attract more 
attention from the tax authority, increasing the risk of financial restatement stemming from tax 
adjustments or disallowed tax claims (Hanlon et al. 2012; Donohoe and Knechel 2014). The 
elevated risk of restatement could lead to costly reputational damage to the auditor (e.g., Cao et 
al. 2012; Hennes et al. 2014; Irani et al. 2015; Christensen et al. 2016; Aobdia 2019). Reflecting the 
major disciplinary role that reputation protection incentives play, individual auditors not 
complicit in audit failures in China still suffer severe reputational damage (He et al. 2016; Su 
and Wu 2019). Consequently, auditors will expend more effort in auditing the client’s tax 
positions when tax enforcement is tougher. It is important to stress that the increased audit 
effort focuses on not only clients’ tax positions, but their overall financial reporting. Prior 
research suggests that tax authority assesses firms’ financial statements (e.g., book-tax gap) in 
corporate tax examinations (Mills 1998; Bozanic et al. 2016; Ayers et al. 2019). As a result, we 
expect that auditors will charge higher fees to compensate for the incremental effort on both tax 
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and non-tax aspects of clients’ financial reporting. It follows that audit fees will rise with tax 
enforcement severity.  
However, there are reasons to suspect that the impact of tax enforcement on audit fees 
will run in the other direction. For starters, the auditor may anticipate that the client’s tax 
aggressiveness and financial reporting risk will fall when tax enforcement is stricter. This 
expectation reconciles with prior research implying that closer monitoring by the tax authority 
constrains corporate tax avoidance (Mills 1998; Hoopes et al. 2012) and earnings management 
(Hanlon et al. 2014). Additionally, when tax enforcement is stricter, firms are naturally eager to 
better prepare for potential tax authority challenges by more extensively researching and 
documenting evidence that helps justify their tax positions. This enhanced effort in the research 
and documentation of tax positions will be revealed to the auditor during the engagement, 
providing additional assurance on the veracity of these amounts. Collectively, these arguments 
suggest that stricter tax enforcement under SAT can relieve the auditor’s concerns about the 
quality of the client’s tax positions and reported earnings, translating into auditors expending 
less effort and charging lower fees in this situation. Given the competing forces in play, the role 
that tax enforcement plays in shaping auditor behavior distils to an empirical question. 
 So far, we consider the implications for external auditors of their clients’ tax 
aggressiveness and financial reporting risk (i.e., tax-related restatements) moving in the same 
direction.18 However, it is important to stress that firms may treat tax aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness as separate channels for increasing reported after-tax 
earnings (Graham et al. 2014). Motivated by financial reporting incentives, firms may elect to 
manage earnings upward (unrelated to the tax accounts) when improving the bottom line via 
                                                          
18 Frank et al. (2009) find that firms that are aggressive in tax reporting are also more likely to be 
aggressive in their financial reporting practices. 
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tax avoidance becomes more costly under a strong tax enforcement regime. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2004) report evidence suggesting that firms resort to relying on tax accounts in managing 
earnings when they exhaust other methods, consistent with the intuition that firms weigh 
various earnings management approaches based on their relative costs. Lennox et al. (2013) find 
that tax-aggressive firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud. Additionally, prior work 
implies that the tax authority may fail to play an effective monitoring role in constraining firms 
from orchestrating financial reporting fraud (Erickson et al. 2004; Dyck et al. 2010). Accordingly, 
to the extent that firms are more likely to manipulate accounting numbers when their tax 
avoidance practices are constrained under tougher tax enforcement, auditors may charge higher 
fees to clients monitored by the SAT. 
Finally, despite the above discussion, auditors may conclude that tax enforcement 
severity has no material impact on either detection risk or clients’ behavior. Reinforcing this 
perspective, Nessa et al. (2019) find no evidence that taxpayers are less likely to claim 
questionable or aggressive positions when IRS resources are higher. This evidence likely reflects 
the allocation of additional resources to audits of tax positions supported by stronger taxpayer 
facts, resulting in fewer collections of proposed tax deficiencies (Nessa et al. 2019). In analyzing 
the impact of IRS in-depth tax audits under the Coordinated Industry Cases (CIC) program, 
Ayers et al. (2019) find that assigning public companies to the CIC program is irrelevant to 
firms’ tax aggressiveness. It follows that if the impact of tax enforcement on corporate tax 
behavior is trivial, we may fail to observe that tax enforcement shapes auditor behavior.  
Consequently, given the tension underlying our research question, we formally state our 
hypothesis in null form, rather than making a directional prediction: 
H1:  There is no difference in audit fees between firms administered by the SAT and 
those administered by the LTB, all else equal. 
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3. Data and research design 
In analyzing the impact of tax enforcement on auditor behavior, our identification 
strategy relies on the variation in tax collector regime (the SAT versus the LTB) stemming from 
the new tax collector arrangement that assigned firms registered on or after the cut-off date 
(January 1, 2002) to the SAT, China’s national tax authority. Firms registered prior to the cut-off 
date continue to follow the former arrangement by remaining under the administration of the 
LTB (SAT 2002). As mentioned earlier, this new tax collector arrangement was announced by 
the government on January 16, 2002 and was unanticipated prior to the official announcement. 
Given that the new tax collector arrangement was unanticipated and that the assignment 
variable (i.e., the firm registration date) is unlikely to be manipulated, the tax collector identity 
(the SAT or the LTB) of firms registered near the cut-off date is randomized, resembling a 
randomized experiment (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Consequently, this regime change allows us to 
implement a sharp RD design to isolate the treatment variation of the tax collector identity, 
which we use as a measure of tax enforcement severity. 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our initial sample includes all China A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015. We 
then impose our first sample screen backward by including only firms established between 2001 
and 2002, one year before and after the policy cut-off date.19 Our choice of a one-year pre- and 
post-policy cut-off window ensures that we have a reasonable number of sample firms for the 
analysis. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires three consecutive years 
of financial statements in IPO filings. Accordingly, it takes at least three years for newly 
registered firms to become listed public companies. For firms established around the year of the 
                                                          
19 As a robustness test of the RD design, we specify a narrower window (e.g., six months or nine months 
before and after the cut-off date) and find that our core results persist.  
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tax reform (2001-2002), the earliest year for them to become listed would be 2005. We choose to 
begin the sample period in 2008 to avoid potential confounding factors related to the change in 
corporate tax rates and the adoption of a new accounting standard in 2007.20, 21 As discussed in 
more detail later, our core results hold if we extend the sample year to 2005, the earliest year 
that firms registered in 2002 can become publicly listed. 
We impose additional criteria to exclude firms not affected by the new tax collector 
arrangement and firms whose characteristics may affect the interpretation of the results. First, 
we exclude central SOEs because they are always administered by the SAT; i.e., they are not 
affected by the new tax collector arrangement. Second, we exclude local SOEs because these 
firms’ tax avoidance behavior may have been altered by the heightened intergovernmental 
agency conflicts around the same period (Tang et al. 2017).22 We also exclude firms registered in 
Shanghai and Tibet because these firms are specially administered by separate tax authorities 
that are not directly comparable to the SAT or the LTB.23 In short, our main sample consists of 
non-state-owned firms. After applying these screening criteria, we are left with a final sample of 
1,233 publicly listed firm-years between 2008 and 2015 registered in 2001 and 2002. In Table 1, 
we summarize the sample selection process. 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                          
20 In 2008, the statutory tax rate rose from 15% to 25% for foreign firms and fell from 33% to 25% for 
domestic firms in China. Since our sample is comprised of strictly domestic firms, we do not expect the 
corporate tax rate change to have differential effects on LTB and SAT firms. We also control, as discussed 
in Appendix B, for any statutory rate differences stemming from industry-specific reductions in our ETR 
regressions.  
21 The accounting rule changes restricted tax reporting to the tax effect method that allows for deferred 
taxes, which may affect the measurement of ETR during this period (Chan et al. 2013). Accordingly, in 
our ETR regressions (Table B1 and Figure B1 in Appendix B), we specify current ETR as our proxy for tax 
avoidance, although the results persist under total ETR. 
22 In another upside, excluding SOEs is constructive from an external validity standpoint. Nevertheless, 
we verify that our core results are materially insensitive to including local SOEs in the sample. 
23 There are no observations for Tibet, so this constraint is not binding. We use Shanghai firms and central 
state-owned firms in our placebo tests. 
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3.2 Research design 
We analyze the impact of the tax authority policy shift on auditor behavior using a pre-
post shock framework given by the following specification: 
Y=α+βSAT(t>=0) + δZ + ε     (1) 
 where the dependent variable Y represents (the natural logarithm of) audit fees for our 
sample firms from 2008 to 2015. t is the registration date normalized to t=0 at the cut-off line of 
January 1, 2002. SAT is an indicator equal to one for firms that registered after the cut-off date 
such that their income taxes are collected and administered by the SAT, and zero otherwise. Z 
denotes a vector of control variables as well as industry and year fixed effects. Our coefficient of 
interest is β, which captures the effect of tax enforcement SAT(t>=0) on audit fees. We follow 
prior work by controlling for variables that have been shown to explain audit fees (Wang et al. 
2008; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Guan et al. 2016; Lennox and Kausar 2017).  
Larger and more complex clients require more audit effort. Accordingly, we include 
firm size measured with the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), the square root of 
employees (EMPLOYEE), the natural logarithm of the number of segments (SEGMENT), and 
listing age (AGE). We also control for audit risk related to clients’ leverage (LEV) and 
operational factors, such as receivable intensity (RECEIVABLE), inventory intensity 
(INVENTORY), and capital asset intensity (PPE). We control for clients’ profitability with net 
income over total assets (ROA), the incidence of negative earnings (LOSS), and firm risk 
measured by annual market-adjusted stock returns for the fiscal year (RETURN). The 
estimations also include BIGFOUR, an indicator variable that identifies Big Four audit firms 
given that these major international audit firms eager to protect their valuable reputations and 
avoid costly litigation are known to supply higher quality audits that warrant higher fees. 
Modified audit opinion (MAO) is also used to control for greater audit effort. Finally, we 
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include institutional factors: whether the client also issues shares in Hong Kong (HSHARE). 
Please refer to Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Identification checks 
In this empirical setup, a key requirement for identification is that the new firms 
registering shortly before and shortly after the cut-off date are comparable. This identification 
requirement could be invalidated if some firms had strategically selected their registration date 
in anticipation of the new tax collector arrangement. To help clarify whether the RD design 
assumption is violated, we plot the number of new firms registered around the policy cut-off 
date at a bi-monthly frequency. In Figure C1 of Appendix C, we plot the sample of all new firms 
registered, regardless of eventual listing status, between January 2000 and December 2003, 
covering two years immediately before and one year immediately after the policy cut-off date. 
This analysis illustrates a new firm registration pattern that solely reflects registration date 
selection and is not affected by subsequent decisions and the ability to become a publicly listed 
firm. There is no visible discontinuity in the number of new firms registered around the cut-off 
date. Additionally, we observe substantial bi-monthly variation in the number of new firms 
registered due to seasonality effects within a calendar year. In unreported analysis, we adjust 
for the bi-monthly seasonality in the data and obtain an even smoother series.  
Besides the graphical analysis, we provide a more formal identification check by 
regressing the monthly new firm registration number on our variable of interest, SAT. We 
conduct this test over three sample windows (24-month, 18-month, and 12-month) surrounding 
the policy cut-off date. As reported in Table C2 of Appendix C, the coefficients on SAT across 
the three sample windows are positive (although statistically indistinguishable from zero in two 
of the three estimations), supporting that the pattern of monthly new firm registration did not 
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suggest that firms were gaming the system by delaying registration to take advantage of the 
assignment to a less stringent tax authority (the LTB). In particular, the coefficient on SAT enters 
positively (albeit at only the 10% level in a two-tailed test) when the sample window is set to 24 
months; in contrast, it fails to load when we narrow the sample window to 18 or 12 months. 
These results suggest that more firms were registered during the early period of the 24-month 
window from January to March 2003. Altogether, the evidence runs against firms strategically 
selecting their registration dates in response to the new arrangement, providing some 
validation for the assumption underlying the RD design. 
The absence of gaming effects may stem from the unanticipated nature of this policy 
initiative. The new tax collector arrangement was announced by the government on January 16, 
2002 and was applied retrospectively for firms registered on or after January 1, 2002. 
Accordingly, entrepreneurs could only time the policy cut-off date by rushing to register a new 
firm to benefit from the old regime if leakage of the arrangement occurred prior to its official 
announcement (or by delaying registration if they perceived the new regime to be more 
beneficial). To explore whether this explanation is viable, we search for press releases and news 
articles pertaining to the arrangement. We do not find any articles suggestive of a potential 
leakage or anticipation of the arrangement prior to its official announcement.  
However, prospective entrepreneurs may still have been informed about the new 
arrangement through channels we are unable to identify. If we assume that prospective 
entrepreneurs were informed about the new arrangement, the absence of gaming effects could 
be due to the lack of perceived differences in tax enforcement strength between the SAT and the 
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LTB in the eyes of the prospective new firm owners.24 In the next section, we compare proxies of 
tax enforcement strength using available data to deepen our understanding of differences in tax 
enforcement between the SAT and LTB. 
4.2 Tax enforcement strength: SAT versus LTB 
In our RD approach, the assignment to the SAT and LTB based on the policy cut-off date 
can be interpreted as an instrumental variable affecting the tax enforcement severity imposed 
on firms. Prior research finds that tax avoidance is lower when tax authority personnel in China 
have more education or expertise, have larger budgets, and conduct more audits (Lin et al. 
2018). We follow Lin et al. (2018) by hand-collecting data from hard copies of the China Tax 
Audit Yearbook on corporate tax enforcement intensity (i.e., the tax audit rate and penalty rate) 
and the resources allocated to corporate tax audits and inspections (i.e., the number of tax 
inspectors per tax audit unit, and inspectors’ education and experience). We then compare these 
measures of corporate tax enforcement and tax authority resources, aggregated at the country 
level, between the SAT and LTB over time, to explore whether the SAT’s corporate tax 
enforcement is indeed stricter than the LTB’s.  
Table 2 reports the mean and median values of the above measures over three periods: 
before the tax collector arrangement (1999-2001, Panel A), after the implementation of the 
arrangement and before our estimation period (2002-2007, Panel B), and during our sample 
period (2008-2015, Panel C). Despite concerted data collection efforts, the availability of certain 
information varies over time; therefore, not all proxies are available during the entire period. 
                                                          
24 Given that users tax enforcement perceptions are naturally unobservable, we follow prior research by 
appealing to rational expectations by assuming that actual enforcement levels constitute unbiased 
estimates of their expectations (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman 2008; Hoopes et al. 2012). 
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In Panel A of Table 2, we compare the mean and median differences in both tax audit 
rate over the number of tax returns (TAX AUDIT) and penalty rate over settled deficiencies 
(TAX PENALTY) between the SAT and LTB three years immediately before the implementation 
of the new tax collector arrangement. The statistics suggest that the tax enforcement efforts, 
evident in both the tax audit rate and the penalty rate, of the SAT are significantly stronger than 
those of the LTB during this pre-event period. In Panel B, we move our timeline to the six-year 
period after the policy and immediately before our sample period (2002-2007). For this 
timeframe, besides TAX AUDIT and TAX PENALTY, we obtain information on the number of 
tax inspectors per tax inspection unit (TAX INSPECTOR/UNIT), which is another way to gauge 
tax enforcement severity. Moreover, the education (DEGREE INSPECTOR) and experience 
(EXPERIENCED INSPECTOR) of tax inspectors are available during this period. These 
additional measures allow us to compare the resources allocated to tax audits and inspections in 
the SAT and LTB. As reported in Panel B, the mean and median values of these variables are 
generally consistent with the conjecture that the SAT imposes stricter tax enforcement relative 
to the LTB; DEGREE INSPECTOR is the lone exception in these pairwise comparisons. In Panel 
C, we compare the mean and median values of tax enforcement proxies during our sample 
period (2008-2015). TAX INSPECTOR/UNIT, DEGREE INSPECTOR, and EXPERIENCED 
INSPECTOR are the only variables with available data during this period. Despite the relatively 
poor data availability, the results reinforce that the SAT has a more educated and experienced 
workforce than the LTB. Overall, the evidence reinforces that the SAT subjects firms to tougher 
tax enforcement. Effectively, assignment to the SAT and LTB around the policy cut-off date 
operates as an instrumental variable. Validating that the SAT applies stricter tax enforcement 
than the LTB provides some assurance that the relevance condition of an instrument is satisfied. 
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[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 3, we provide some descriptive statistics. For the full sample, we report in Panel 
A that the mean (median) audit fee is approximately 652,000 (600,000) Chinese Yuan, which is 
equivalent to US$100,500 (US$92,500). This amount is slightly larger than that of Guan et al. 
(2016), who analyze a slightly earlier period. Our sample firms have a mean audit lag of 92 
days. Approximately 13.1% (5.7%) of the firm-year observations experience an accounting 
restatement (tax-related restatement). The mean ETR for the full sample is 19.9%.  
In Panel B of Table 3, we report that both the mean and median audit fee (FEE) of firms 
under SAT administration are significantly lower than those of firms under LTB administration, 
providing some preliminary evidence that auditors charge firms administered by the SAT lower 
audit fees. Firms under SAT monitoring also exhibit shorter audit reporting lags, a higher 
incidence of modified audit opinions, and higher effective tax rates than firms overseen by the 
LTB. For the vast majority of firm-level characteristics, there are no perceptible differences 
between the two groups. In the only exceptions, SAT firms are smaller (in terms of assets and 
employees) and younger (AGE).25 To further neutralize the potential effects of these differences 
on our results, we employ two matching methodologies (propensity score matching and 
entropy balance matching) in sensitivity analysis to construct treatment (SAT) and control (LTB) 
samples that are comparable on all firm-level control variables (see Table 8, Panel C). 
 [Please insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
25 Firm age (AGE) is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm went public. 
The mean difference in the unlogged value of AGE between SAT and LTB firms is less than one year. The 
results are similar when we define firm age as the natural logarithm of the duration since incorporation. 
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4.4 Tax enforcement and corporate tax aggressiveness 
Initially, we analyze the impact of tax enforcement on the level of corporate tax 
avoidance. Although this result has been established in prior work (e.g., Hoopes et al. 2012; Lin 
et al. 2018), we examine this issue for two reasons: (i) to verify that the tax behavior that our 
sample firms exhibit is similar to the firms studied in other U.S. or China settings; and (ii) to 
provide within-sample empirical evidence given that the effect of tax enforcement on tax 
aggressiveness is a major channel through which tax enforcement may affect audit fees. Our 
proxy for tax avoidance is current effective tax rates (Current_ETR) (e.g., Rego 2003; Tang et al. 
2017; Lin et al. 2018). We first plot the discontinuity in Current_ETR around the threshold or 
policy cut-off date (January 1, 2002) in Figure B1 of Appendix B. Firms just to the left (right) of 
the threshold are administered by the LTB (SAT). Both the linear and quadratic plots under 
Figure 1 present a jump in Current_ETR around the threshold as a result of tax enforcement.26  
Next, we formally evaluate the impact of tax enforcement on Current_ETR using a 
regression approach. We follow prior research by including several firm characteristics 
associated with tax planning opportunities or tax outcomes. We include firm size (SIZE), firm 
age (AGE), and pre-tax performance (PT_ROA) to control for tax planning incentives (Mills et al. 
1998; Rego 2003; Frank et al. 2009). We include leverage (LEV), property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) and intangible assets (INTANG) to control for debt tax shields and investment related to 
tax incentives, such as depreciation and amortization (Graham and Tucker 2006). We include 
inventory intensity (INVENTORY) and the number of geographic segments (SEGMENT) to 
control for tax planning opportunities (Mills et al. 1998; Gallemore and Labro 2015). 
                                                          
26 In untabulated regressions, we find consistent results using firms’ book value of assets (Mills et al. 
1998) and market value of assets (Henry and Sansing 2018) as an alternative denominator of ETR to retain 
the loss firms. 
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Additionally, we control for firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness, proxied by the absolute 
values of abnormal accruals (ABSDA (Dechow et al. 1995), to mitigate concerns over the 
influence of firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness on their corporate tax policies (Frank et al. 
2009). Finally, we control for applicable statutory tax rates (STAT_TAX_RATE) since beneficial 
tax rates may apply to firms in different industry sectors and/or provinces (Tang et al. 2017).  
In Column (1) of Table B1, the results indicate that the coefficient on SAT is positively 
related to Current_ETR (0.031, t=3.02) using a specification including only industry and year 
dummies. The results in Column (2) show that the coefficient on SAT remains significantly 
positively related to Current_ETR (0.022, t=2.04) after including the full set of control variables 
as well as industry and year fixed effects. To further mitigate the inherent differences of firm 
size and industry embedded in Current_ETR, we employ the industry- and size-adjusted 
measure (Ind_Size_ETR) developed in Balakrishnan et al. (2019). In Column (3), we continue to 
find that SAT enters positively under Ind_Size_ETR (0.022, t=2.14).27 In short, this evidence 
implies that the SAT imposes stricter tax enforcement than the LTB.  
Prior research suggests that tax audits in China reduce firms’ income-decreasing 
accruals, reflecting that tax authority monitoring deters firms from underreporting their taxable 
income (Lin et al. 2014; Li et al. 2019). In another approach to validating our tax monitoring 
proxy, we evaluate whether the SAT is more effective than the LTB in constraining firms’ 
discretionary accruals that can potentially lead to lower taxable income. Using three standard 
estimation models for discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
Kothari et al. 2005) in unreported regressions, we find that the SAT has a significantly negative 
impact on downward earnings management, ranging from -11.1% to -34.8%, depending on the 
                                                          
27 The results are qualitatively similar using total ETR as well as ETR measured over multiple years (3-
year or 5-year measure).  
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model. These results reconcile with Lin et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2019), lending additional 
support that the SAT imposes tougher tax enforcement than the LTB. 
4.5 Tax enforcement and audit fees: Test of H1 
Figure 1 displays the plots of the discontinuity in audit fees around the policy cut-off 
date. Again, firms just to the left of the threshold are under the LTB and firms just to the right of 
the threshold are under the SAT. Both the linear and quadratic plots in Figure 1 show a sharp 
drop in audit fees around the threshold as a result of tax enforcement.  
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
Before proceeding to estimate the effect of tax enforcement on audit fees using 
regressions, we validate that the control variables we use are balanced across the threshold by 
regressing each of the control variables on SAT along with industry and year fixed effects (Lin 
et al. 2018). As reported in Panel A of Table 4, the results indicate almost no statistical evidence 
for a discontinuity of any control variable around the threshold.28 It follows that discontinuous 
control variables are unlikely to bias our findings. 
[Please insert Table 4 Panel A about here] 
In Table 4, we report in Panel B the regression results for the prediction in H1, which 
focuses on the importance of tax enforcement to audit fees. In Column (1), the coefficient on 
SAT is significantly negative (-0.084, t=-2.45) after we control for industry and year fixed effects. 
In Column (2), the coefficient on SAT continues to enter negatively (-0.051, t=-2.13) after we 
control for other determinants of audit fees according to prior research. Next, we follow Lee and 
                                                          
28 Predictably given the mechanical relation, the lone exception is AGE. However, as discussed earlier, the 
mean difference is less than 1 year (Table 1). Results in regression analysis controlling for AGE suggest 
that it is not a significant factor in our tests. In matched sample analysis, the differences in AGE, among 
other variables, are fully mitigated to ensure the full comparability between the SAT and LTB samples. 
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Lemieux (2010) and Saez et al. (2012) by evaluating whether our RD results persist after adding 
a linear registration date trend variable and its interaction with SAT to the estimation. In 
Column (3), we find that our evidence is robust to this approach.29 Reflecting its first-order 
economic materiality, the coefficient estimate on SAT implies that, on average, the stricter tax 
enforcement under the SAT translates into audit fees falling by 5% to 15.9%, depending on the 
specification. Shifting gears to the control variables, we find that almost all are statistically 
significant in the predicted directions (e.g., Wang et al. 2008; Hanlon et al. 2012; Guan et al. 
2016). Collectively, our results imply that stricter tax enforcement leads to lower audit fees, 
lending support to rejecting the prediction in H1 that no difference exists in audit fees between 
firms administered by the SAT and those administered by the LTB. 
 [Please insert Table 4 Panel B about here] 
4.6 Tax enforcement and audit report lag  
 Since audit fees reflect both effort and risk premia, we examine the impact of tax 
enforcement on the audit reporting lag, specified as the duration between the balance sheet date 
and the audit report date to provide triangulating evidence (e.g., Bamber et al. 1993; Tanyi et al. 
2010). We expect that the stricter tax enforcement under the SAT will translate into auditors 
expending less effort evident in a shorter audit report lag. Table 5 reports the results for the 
audit report lag regressions. In Column (1), the coefficient on SAT is significantly negative (-
0.008, t=-2.21), suggesting that tougher tax enforcement results in shorter audit delays. After 
controlling for the linear date trend and its interaction with SAT in Column (2), we find that the 
coefficient of SAT remains significantly negative, albeit at only the 10% level (-0.014, t=-1.73). 
                                                          
29 In additional robustness checks (untabulated), we continue to find supportive evidence when the 
regressions include higher polynomial terms of trends and the corresponding interaction term with SAT. 
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Collectively, our evidence implies that tighter tax monitoring leads to lower audit fees and 
shorter audit report lags, consistent with tax enforcement improving audit efficiency. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
4.7 Tax enforcement and restatements 
To explore whether auditors devoting less effort comes at the expense of their audit 
quality, we examine the relation between tax enforcement and the likelihood of financial 
restatements, a signal of audit failure (e.g., Cao et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2016; Aobdia 2019), 
including in China (e.g., He et al. 2017; Li et al. 2017; Su and Wu 2019). In Column (1) of Table 6, 
we find that stricter tax enforcement (SAT) leads to a lower likelihood of accounting restatement 
(-0.077, t=-4.09). This implies that the lower audit effortevident in cheaper audit pricing and a 
shorter audit report lagin the presence of the SAT documented earlier does not come at the 
cost of sacrificing audit quality evident in the incidence of egregious financial reporting failures. 
This evidence becomes stronger (-0.219, t=-6.88) when we control for both the linear date trend 
and its interaction with SAT in Column (2). Additionally, in Columns (3) and (4), we find 
supportive evidence that tougher tax enforcement leads to a lower likelihood of tax-related 
restatements, irrespective of whether we control for the date trend and its interaction with 
SAT.30  
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
4.8 Cross-sectional analysis: Tax enforcement differences at the local office level 
Next, we isolate settings in which the spillover effects of tax enforcement may play a 
larger role in shaping auditor behavior. Like the IRS in the U.S., the SAT operates regional 
                                                          
30 In Table 6, we report results using a linear probability model, although the results (untabulated) are 
both quantitatively and qualitatively similar using logit as the estimation technique. 
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offices to facilitate tax enforcement and collection from taxpayers. Although the central SAT sets 
the tone and determines the overall resources committed to corporate tax enforcement at the 
national level, enforcement intensity may vary across local offices. Accordingly, the tax 
enforcement at a regional SAT office may be more lenient in comparison to the LTB office in 
certain locations. To deepen our analysis by exploring the channel potentially underlying the 
observed results, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in tax audit rates and penalty rates 
across local offices of the SAT and LTB. Using hand-collected data on tax enforcement measures 
at the local office levels, we specify an indicator equal to one for firms located in provinces 
where the median tax audit rate and penalty rate of the provincial SAT office are higher than 
those of the provincial/local LTB office. This variable captures the relative strength of tax 
enforcement between the SAT and LTB at the local office level. We label this variable 
HIGH_SAT_ENFORCE and interact it with our SAT indicator. We report the results in Table 7.  
Consistent with expectations, we find that the impact of tax enforcement is stronger for 
firms in provinces where the local SAT office exerts observably stricter tax enforcement than the 
local LTB office. More specifically, in Panel A, the coefficient on the interaction term 
(SAT×HIGH_SAT_ENFORCE) is significantly negative for audit fees (-0.105, t=-2.11), audit 
report lag (-0.012, t=-1.71), accounting restatements (-0.090, t=-2.28) and tax-related restatements 
(-0.150, t=-4.15), corroborating our earlier evidence. For audit fees, accounting restatements and 
tax-related restatements, the results are virtually identical when we control for the linear date 
trend and its interaction with SAT. However, in the audit report lag regression, the coefficient 
on the interaction term becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero when we add the 
linear date trend and its interaction with SAT to the model (-0.011, t=-1.48). Overall, in 
exploiting the cross-sectional variation in tax audit rates and penalty rates at the local office 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3487193
 30 
 
level of the SAT and LTB, we provide evidence in seven of the eight estimations implying that 
tax enforcement constitutes the channel underlying the main results reported earlier. 
4.9 Cross-sectional analysis: industry expert auditor 
In our second set of cross-sectional analyses, we examine whether the spillover effect of 
tax enforcement on auditor behavior varies systematically with the presence of an industry 
specialist auditor. We expect that auditors are in a better position to evaluate the implications of 
tax enforcement to the client when they have expertise in the client’s industry since, for 
example, complex tax planning strategies are highly industry-specific (Balakrishnan et al. 2019).  
To examine this conjecture, we follow prior research in specifying industry specialist 
auditors (INDUSTRY_EXPERT) (e.g., Audousset-Coulier et al. 2015) and interact it with our 
SAT indicator in Equation (1). In the results reported in Panel B of Table 7, we find that, under 
the stronger tax enforcement of the SAT, the results of lower audit fees, shorter audit report lag, 
and fewer restatements are all concentrated in firms that appoint industry specialist auditors.   
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
4.10 Robustness checks 
We conduct two placebo tests to provide additional assurance that our observed results 
reflect the differences in tax enforcement severity between the tax collectors. First, we 
hypothetically move the policy cut-off time backward (and forward) by one year to January 
2001 (January 2003) and conduct the same empirical analysis between firms registered in 2000 
and 2001 (2002 and 2003). In Panels A1 and A2 of Table 8, we report the results from examining 
the impact of the falsified policy dates on audit outcomes, including audit fees, audit delay, 
financial restatements and tax-related restatements. Consistent with expectations, none of the 
coefficients on SAT_PLACEBO1 or SAT_PLACEBO2 are significant at conventional levels.  
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Second, we re-run our tests on a group of firms for which the new tax collector 
arrangement is irrelevant: Shanghai firms and central state-owned firms. The collection and 
administration of income tax for Shanghai firms are handled by the Shanghai Municipal Tax 
Service, which acts as a combination of the SAT and LTB. Central state-owned firms are always 
subject to the SAT’s monitoring. Consistent with expectations, the results in Panel A3 of Table 8 
indicate that, for Shanghai firms and central state-owned firms registered in 2001 and 2002, their 
audit fees, audit report lags, and the propensity for financial restatements are not perceptibly 
affected during our estimation period. The results of these placebo tests help dispel the 
competing explanation that other economic conditions surrounding the policy cut-off time are 
spuriously responsible for our core results. 
Third, we restrict the sample to firms that were newly registered closer to the policy cut-
off date. Recall that in the main analysis, we set a 24-month window around the policy cut-off 
date and include new firms that registered during the window (and those became public 
between 2008 and 2015) as our sample firms. Although including firms that registered further 
away from the threshold has the benefit of yielding a larger sample, this may come at the 
expense of admitting bias because such firms are further away from the threshold. Additionally, 
including firms that registered further away from the two sides of the threshold will likely 
engender a larger difference in firm age, as well as other covariates that may grow with age 
such as firm size and the number of employees as reported in Panel B of Table 8. Using a 
narrower window will lower the probability of bias (Saez et al. 2012) and reduce the differences 
in firm-level characteristics that are associated with firm age between the two groups. We 
present the results in Panel B of Table 8 using (i) an 18-month window; and (ii) a 12-month 
window. Our results imply that the effects of more stringent tax enforcement on our main 
outcomes are highly robust, evident in the results improving in terms of both statistical 
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significance and economic magnitude as the time window narrows. The results (untabulated) 
are similar after controlling for the date trend. 
As another empirical strategy to confront this issue, we employ two matching 
methodologies to construct treatment (SAT) and control (LTB) samples that are comparable. 
First, we create a matched sample using propensity score matching (PSM). We begin by 
estimating the probability of being a SAT firm using a logit framework with our set of 
covariates and both year and industry fixed effects included. We follow Shipman et al. (2017) by 
compiling the matched sample using the 1:1 nearest neighbor matching technique without 
replacement and a caliper set at 0.03. The matched sample consists of 830 firms. In Table 8 Panel 
C1, we reassuringly report that the SAT firms and LTB firms are comparable across all 
covariates. The regression results using this PSM matched sample reinforce our earlier findings. 
Second, we assemble another matched sample using the entropy balancing method. 
Consistent with Hainmueller (2012), we reweight the covariates of the LTB firms to reach 
covariant balance using the first moment adjustment. As shown in Panel C2 of Table 8, no 
perceptible differences in the means of the control variables remain between the two groups 
after applying the reweighting procedure. The regression results based on this matched sample 
are nearly identical to the evidence using the full sample and the PSM matched sample.  
Finally, we extend the sample to 2005, the earliest year possible for the newly registered 
firms in 2002 to become publicly listed companies in China. We report the results in Table 8 
Panel D. The coefficient on SAT enters negatively in the audit pricing (-0.048, t=-2.21), audit 
report delay (-0.008, t=-2.30), accounting restatements (-0.052, t=-2.59), and tax-related 
restatements (-0.058, t=-3.14) regressions, reflecting that our main evidence is materially 
insensitive to the sample construction. The results (untabulated) are almost identical when we 
add the date trend variables. We also find that our core results persist when we exclude firms 
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that are cross-listed in Hong Kong given that its legal and regulatory institutions, including 
those governing auditor discipline (e.g., Ke et al. 2015), are far stronger than those in China. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
4.11 Additional analysis: Audit report informativeness 
In this section, we examine the importance of tax enforcement to the informativeness of 
auditor reporting decisions to provide triangulating evidence on our earlier results on audit 
quality using accounting and tax-related restatements. We focus on the informativeness of 
modified audit opinions in terms of the accuracy of the audit opinion in reflecting the client’s 
financial condition given that deterioration in the informativeness of audit reports may indicate 
impaired auditor independence (e.g., Geiger and Rama 2003). We follow prior research by 
measuring the informativeness or accuracy of auditor reporting from an ex post perspective 
(e.g., Holder-Webb and Wilkins 2000; Carcello et al. 2009; Guan et al. 2016). This involves 
coding INACCUR_MAO equal to one if a modified audit opinion is issued but financial distress 
is not realized ex post or a modified audit opinion is not issued but financial distress is realized 
ex post, and zero otherwise. We identify the ex post realization of financial distress with whether 
a firm received a “Special Treatment” warning of delisting risk from the stock exchange or its 
stock was delisted two years after receiving the modified audit opinion (Guan et al. 2016). 
The results from analyzing the role that tax enforcement plays in shaping the 
informativeness of auditor reporting are provided in Table 9. In Column (1), the coefficient on 
SAT is significantly negative (-0.949, z=-1.92), suggesting that auditor reporting becomes more 
informative when tax enforcement is stricter. In Column (2), however, this result becomes 
insignificant after we control for the date trend. Altogether, this evidence implies that the lower 
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auditor effort expended under the tougher tax enforcement regime does not undermine the 
information value of audit reporting.  
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
4.12 Additional analysis: Audit firm level efficiency—audit partner assignments 
 Our analysis so far implies that audit efficiency improves under stricter tax enforcement. 
However, another issue is whether the efficiency of resource allocation at the audit-firm level is 
sensitive to corporate tax enforcement. In providing initial evidence on this question, we focus 
on audit partners given that these highly-educated professionals are among audit firms’ most 
valuable assets. Moreover, since the client-auditor assignment decision is determined by the 
audit firm (Ke et al. 2015), this assignment represents resource allocation decisions from the 
audit firm’s perspective. We identify audit partners, manually collect their biographical 
information, and measure audit partner i’s experience (PARTNERS_EXPERIENCE) relative to 
other partners within the audit firm using the approach taken by Ke et al. (2015).  
 We report in Table 10 the results from examining the role that tax enforcement plays in 
partner assignments. In Column (1), the coefficient on SAT is significantly negative (-2.705, t=-
1.89), suggesting that client firms subject to SAT monitoring are assigned less-experienced audit 
partners. In Column (2), after we control for the date trend, SAT remains significantly negative 
(-6.738, t=-2.25). These results reconcile with our earlier evidence that tougher tax enforcement 
reduces audit fees because less-experienced audit partners charge lower per-hour rates (Lee et 
al. 2019). This evidence implies that, from the standpoint of the audit firm, the demand for 
auditing subsides when the client experiences stricter tax enforcement. Importantly, despite 
being assigned to less-experienced audit partners, clients administered by the SAT enjoy higher 
audit quality evident in the incidence of accounting misstatements and tax-related 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3487193
 35 
 
misstatements, as shown earlier. Collectively, our findings suggest that tax enforcement 
generates a positive externality to the audit market.  
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
4.13 Additional analysis: Auditors’ client portfolio management 
 As discussed earlier, DeFond and Zhang (2014) summarize four strategies auditors 
routinely apply in response to higher client risk and complexity: (i) exert more effort to improve 
audit quality; (ii) charge a higher fee premium; (3) manage their client portfolio; and (4) lobby 
for litigation relief. After analyzing the first two strategic responses, we next shed light on the 
third potential strategy; i.e., client portfolio management (e.g., Johnstone and Bedard 2004).31  
Prior research suggests that auditors consider how prospective clients compare with 
each other and with the characteristics of their client portfolio in determining whether to accept 
a new client (Johnstone and Bedard 2004). Our earlier results suggest that auditors value cross-
monitoring by the SAT. It follows that SAT firms are attractive clients according to auditors’ 
screening process. We follow prior research on new client acceptance decisions by gauging 
whether SAT firms are more likely to become clients of Big Four auditors (Hsieh and Lin 2016). 
Empirically, we use continuing clients as the benchmark group because the potential new 
clients screened out by Big Four auditors are unobservable to researchers (Hsieh and Lin 2016). 
Specifically, we regress variables representing client and audit firms’ characteristics (which 
include BIGFOUR, SAT, and their interaction, our variable of interest) on a variable indicating a 
newly accepted client firm-year. Our results (untabulated) show that the interaction term 
SAT×BIGFOUR is significantly positive (granted at only the 10% level), lending support that 
                                                          
31 As stressed earlier, the lax institutions governing investor protection in China suggest that litigation 
incentives play almost no role in disciplining auditors since lawsuits against auditors almost never 
succeed there (He et al. 2016). 
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SAT firms are more likely to become Big Four clients. This result holds when we re-specify large 
auditors as the domestic top ten according to market share, and control for clients’ audit and 
financial risks (Hsieh and Lin 2016).32 These findings imply that SAT firms are favored in the 
client-screening process for Big Four auditors, consistent with the Big Four weighing the tax 
authority identity as they actively manage their client portfolio (Johnstone and Bedard 2004).  
 Although the results from the new client acceptance analysis above are suggestive of 
auditors’ client portfolio management, this evidence may be driven by SAT clients’ selection of 
Big Four auditors (Lennox and Pittman 2010). To explore whether the results primarily reflect 
auditor screening of clients or client selection of their auditor, we examine in another test 
whether the frequencies of downgrades from a Big Four to a non-Big Four auditor (or upgrades 
from a non-Big Four to a Big Four) and lateral switches vary systematically between SAT and 
LTB firms (Lennox and Pittman 2010). This evidence (untabulated) implies that, compared to 
LTB firms, SAT firms are significantly less likely to downgrade from a Big Four to a non-Big 
Four auditor, implying that Big Four auditors possess superior screening and favor SAT clients. 
Concerning upgrades from non-Big Four to Big Four auditors, we do not find any perceptible 
difference between SAT and LTB firms, which is inconsistent with the argument that SAT 
clients select Big Four auditors.33 Taken together, our results support that Big Four auditors 
consider the tax authority identity in relying on a portfolio approach to manage audit risk. 
  
                                                          
32 In a standard re-specification, we identify large auditors with whether they belong to the domestic top 
ten audit firms in China (e.g., Wang et al., 2008; Gul et al., 2013; He et al., 2016). 
33 Our sample includes 241 auditor switches, with 15 incidents of downgrades from a Big Four to a non-
Big Four auditor, 168 incidents of lateral switches (i.e., from one Big Four auditor to another; or from one 
non-Big Four auditor to another), and 58 incidents of upgrades from non-Big Four to a Big Four. In our 
analysis, we compare upgrades and downgrades with lateral switches. 
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5. Conclusion 
 We examine the impact of stricter tax enforcement on auditors. Effective in 2002, China 
implemented a new tax collector arrangement such that firms registered in 2002 onwards are 
subject to the administration of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), the national tax 
authority in China. Firms that registered before 2002 follow the old regime and remain under 
the administration of the Local Tax Bureau (LTB). This sharp regime shift offers a fertile quasi-
experimental setting for identifying the effect of tax enforcement by comparing firms subject to 
the administration of the SAT (i.e., those that registered on or after 2002 under the new 
arrangement) and firms under the administration of the LTB (i.e., those that registered as of 
2001 under the former arrangement). 
We implement a research discontinuity design and compare auditor behavior for firms 
monitored by two tax authorities. Our results show that auditors exert less effort on clients 
monitored by the stricter tax authority (SAT) than they do for clients monitored by the more 
lenient one (LTB), as evident in lower audit fees and shorter audit report lags. Additionally, we 
document that firms monitored by the SAT are significantly less likely to experience financial or 
tax-related restatements, suggesting that the apparent decrease in effort does not come at the 
expense of audit quality. We also find that audit firms assign less-experienced partners to 
clients monitored by the tougher tax authority, implying that audit firms consider those clients 
as requiring less demand for auditing and optimize the matching of client and partner. Finally, 
we also find evidence suggestive of clients under SAT are viewed positively by Big Four 
auditors, consistent with Big Four auditors valuing the tax authority identity when 
implementing a portfolio approach to managing audit risk. Our paper offers novel and robust 
results on the spillover effects of tax enforcement on the audit market and audit efficiency. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition Sources 
 
SAT Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s 
income tax is administered by the State 
Administration of Taxation (i.e., firms 
registered in 2002) and zero if it is 
administered by the Local Taxation Bureau 
(i.e., registered in 2001). 
CSMAR 
Current_ETR Current income tax expense divided by pre-
tax income. Set as missing when the 
denominator is zero or negative; truncated 
at [0, 1]. 
CSMAR 
Ind_Size_ETR A firm’s Current_ETR less the mean 
Current_ETR for the portfolio of firms in the 
same decile of total assets and the same 
industry. 
CSMAR 
FEE Natural logarithm of total audit fees. CSMAR 
LAG The number of days from a company’s 
fiscal year-end to the date of the auditor’s 
report, scaled by 365 days. 
CSMAR 
RESTATE_FINANCIAL Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s 
earnings are restated or if the firm is 
sanctioned by regulatory bodies (e.g., China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance, or their stock 
exchanges) due to accounting frauds or 
accounting irregularities during the sample 
period, and 0 otherwise (He et al. 2017). 
CSMAR 
RESTATE_TAX Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s 
earnings are restated due to income tax 
issues.  
CSMAR 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. CSMAR 
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets. CSMAR 
ROA Net income divided by total assets. CSMAR 
PT_ROA Net income before income tax divided by 
total assets. 
CSMAR 
STAT_TAX_RATE Statutory tax rate applied to the firm (may 
vary due to industry). 
CSMAR 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s net 
income is below zero and zero otherwise. 
CSMAR 
PPE Total fixed assets divided by total assets. CSMAR 
INTANG Total intangible assets divided by total 
assets. 
CSMAR 
RECEIVABLE Total receivables divided by total assets. CSMAR 
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INVENTORY Inventory divided by total assets. CSMAR 
R&D Research and development expenditure 
divided by total assets. 
CSMAR 
BIGFOUR Indicator variable equal to one if the audit 
firm is a “Big 4 firm” (i.e., one of the four 
major international audit firms) in the 
current year and zero otherwise. 
CSMAR 
SEGMENT The natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of geographic segments. 
CSMAR 
RETURN Annual market-adjusted stock returns 
during the fiscal year. 
CSMAR 
HSHARE Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
also listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and zero otherwise. 
CSMAR 
AGE Natural logarithm of the difference between 
current year and IPO year plus one (+1). 
CSMAR 
EMPLOYEE The square root of the number employees 
(in thousands). 
CSMAR 
ABSDA Absolute discretionary accrual, 
discretionary accruals are obtained from 
cross-sectional estimations of the modified 
Jones model of accruals quality (Jones 1991; 
Dechow et al. 1995). 
CSMAR 
TAXAGG Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s 
Current_ETR is in the lowest quintile and 
zero otherwise (Donohoe and Knechal 
2014). 
CSMAR 
CFO Net operation cash flow divided by total 
assets. 
CSMAR 
CURRENT_RATIO Current asset divided by current liability. CSMAR 
SALES_GROWTH (Salest - Salest-1)/ Salest-1 CSMAR 
ASSET_TO Asset turnover, defined as total sales 
divided by total assets. 
CSMAR 
TACCRUAL Total accruals, calculated as the difference 
between net income and net cash flow from 
operations scaled by sales. 
CSMAR 
MAO Indicator variable equal to one if the auditor 
issues a modified report and zero 
otherwise. 
CSMAR 
INACCUR_MAO Indicator variable equal to one if a modified 
audit opinion is issued but financial distress 
is not realized ex post, or a modified audit 
opinion is not issued but financial distress is 
realized ex post and zero otherwise. Ex post 
realization of financial distress is 
determined by whether a firm received a 
CSMAR 
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“Special Treatment” warning of delisting 
risk from the stock exchange or whether its 
stocks are delisted in year t+2 (e.g., Holder-
Webb and Wilkins 2000; Carcello et al. 2009;  
Guan et al. 2016). 
PARTNERS_EXPERIENCE Average relative experience (years) of the 
two partners who sign the audit report (Ke 
et al. 2015), defined as the mean value of 
RELATIVE YEARS for the two signing 
partners. (Note: Audit reports in China are 
signed by two audit partners.) RELATIVE 
YEARS is defined below.  
CSMAR 
RELATIVE YEARS The experience (years) of audit partner i 
relative to all other partners in the same 
audit firm (Ke et al. 2015). For each partner, 
we count the number of years that the 
partner has audited at least one listed 
company up to the beginning of year t. The 
relative experience of audit partner i 
(RELATIVE YEARS) is defined as:  
 100 −
(−1+𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡)
(−1+𝑁𝑗𝑡)
× 100 
where RANK YEARSijt is partner i's ranking 
in audit firm j in year t. Njt is the total 
number of partners in audit firm j at year t. 
The value of RANK YEARSijt is between 0 
and 100, with higher values indicating that 
partner i has relatively more experience.  
CSMAR 
HIGH_SAT_ENFORCE Indicator variable equal to one if the 
provincial SAT’s median tax audit rate and 
penalty rate from 1999 to 2007 are greater 
than the LTB’s and zero otherwise. 
China Tax Audit 
Yearbook (Hand-
collected) 
INDUSTRY_EXPERT Indicator variable equal to one if the audit 
firm is an expert in the client’s industry, and 
zero otherwise. Following the approach of 
Audousset-Coulier et al. (2015), we identify 
an audit firm i as a specialist in industry j 
when audit firm i's weighted market share 
is bigger than [(1/N)×1.2]×(1/K).  
 
Where weighted market share for audit firm 
i is equal to its audit fees in industry j 
divided by the sum of audit fees in industry 
j for all audit firms; N is the number of 
audit firms in industry j; K is the number of 
industries that audit firm i serves. 
CSMAR 
SAT_PLACEBO1 Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is CSMAR 
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established in 2001 and zero if it is 
established in 2000. 
SAT_PLACEBO2 Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
established in 2003 and zero if it is 
established in 2002. 
CSMAR 
REG2002 Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
registered in Shanghai or central a SOE in 
2002 and zero if it is registered in Shanghai 
or a central SOE in 2001. 
CSMAR 
TAX AUDIT The number of tax audits conducted over 
the number of total tax returns filed. 
China Tax Audit 
Yearbook (Hand-
collected) 
TAX PENALTY The amount of penalties over the amount of 
tax deficiencies settled. 
China Tax Audit 
Yearbook (Hand-
collected) 
TAX INSPECTOR/UNIT The number of tax audit inspectors over the 
number of tax audit institutions. 
China Tax Audit 
Yearbook (Hand-
collected) 
DEGREE INSPECTOR The percentage of tax inspectors with a 
undergraduate degree or higher over the 
total number of tax inspectors. 
China Tax Audit 
Yearbook (Hand-
collected) 
EXPERIENCED INSPECTOR The number of experienced tax inspectors 
over the total number of tax inspectors. A 
tax inspector is considered experienced if 
she/he is older than 40 years old (Panel B) 
or 45 years old (Panel C). 
China Tax Audit 
Yearbook (Hand-
collected) 
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Appendix B: Tax Enforcement and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
Figure B1: Tax Aggressiveness around the Threshold 
 
 
 
This figure shows regression discontinuity plots of firms’ Current_ETR with linear (top graph) and 
quadratic (bottom graph) fits. The x-axis displays the month relative to the threshold date (January 1, 
2002). Positive (negative) values indicate the firm’s income tax is administered by SAT (LTB). The y-axis 
shows the mean effective tax rates in the respective month. 
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APPENDIX B: Tax Enforcement and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
Table B1: Tax Enforcement and Current Effective Tax Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Current_ETR Current_ETR Ind_Size_ETR 
SAT 0.031*** 0.022** 0.022** 
 (3.02) (2.04) (2.14) 
SIZE  0.007 0.007 
  (0.93) (0.97) 
AGE  -0.004 -0.001 
  (-0.39) (-0.12) 
PT_ROA  -0.850*** -0.711*** 
  (-6.50) (-5.81) 
LEV  0.052 0.051 
  (1.32) (1.46) 
PPE  -0.083 -0.092* 
  (-1.55) (-1.94) 
INTANG  -0.144 -0.137 
  (-0.87) (-0.88) 
INVENTORY  0.036 0.029 
  (0.57) (0.50) 
SEGMENT  0.009 0.012 
  (1.12) (1.52) 
ABSDA  -0.160*** -0.164*** 
  (-2.60) (-2.68) 
STAT_TAX_RATE  0.485*** 0.390*** 
  (3.53) (3.13) 
    
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year Industry + Year 
N 1,157 1,067 1,067 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.136 0.086 
This table reports OLS results of the effect of tax enforcement on corporate tax aggressiveness, measured 
by firms’ current effective tax rates. SAT is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is 
administered by the State Administration of Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is 
administered by the Local Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered in 2001). For brevity, the intercept and fixed 
effects are not tabulated. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-
year level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Appendix C: Identification Checks 
Figure C1: Number of New Firm Registration around the Policy Cut-off Date (Bi-
Monthly) 
 
 
This figure displays the bi-monthly number of new firms registered by registration period in the sample 
of all Chinese firms (regardless of subsequent listing status) two years before and after the policy cut-off 
date (January 1, 2002) from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2003. Note the large bi-monthly variations in 
the number of registrations due to seasonality within a calendar year across the 4-year period. The graph 
displays no sharp changes at the cut-off date, suggesting firms did not manipulate or control their 
registration date. 
 
Table C1: Number of New Firm Registration around the Policy Cut-off Date (Bi-
Monthly) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Period 24-month Window 
2001.01-2002.12 
18-month Window 
2001.04-2002.09 
12-month Window 
2001.07-2002.06 
SAT 9199* 8283 6371 
 (1.87) (1.46) (0.82) 
    
Constant 53417*** 55657*** 54118*** 
 (15.39) (13.89) (9.82) 
N (number of month) 24 18 12 
This table displays the OLS coefficients from regressing the bi-monthly number of bi-monthly new firm 
registrations on our variable of interest, SAT, an indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is 
administered by the State Administration of Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is 
administered by the Local Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered in 2001). Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the 
results using a 24-month, 18-month, and 12-month window, respectively, surrounding the policy cut-off 
date of 1/1/2012. The sample includes all Chinese firms, regardless of subsequent listing status.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Sample selection criteria for main analysis 
Observations 
(Firm-year) 
 
A-share listed companies established between 1/1/2001 and 
31/12/2002 (one year before and after the policy cut-off date of 
1/1/2002) that are covered in the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database during our sample period 
from 2008 to 2015. 
2,206 
  
Less: State-owned enterprises (SOEs) (556) 
Less: Firms registered in Shanghai and Tibet (99) 
Less: Financial firms  (0) 
Less: Firms with missing data for the main variables (318) 
  
Final sample 1,233 
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Table 2: Provincial-level Differences between the SAT and LTB 
Panel A: Before the New Tax Collector Arrangement: 1999-2001 
Variables SAT  LTB  SAT - LTB 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  
Mean  
Diff 
Median 
Diff 
TAX AUDIT (%) 72 16.773 12.000  69 10.894 7.000  5.878*** 5.000** 
TAX PENALTY (%) 68 15.382 12.000  68 10.426 11.000  4.956*** 1.000** 
TAX AUDIT is available in 2000 and 2001, and PENALTY is available in 1999 and 2001. 
 
Panel B: After the New Tax Collector Arrangement and Before Our Sample Period: 
2002-2007 
Variables SAT  LTB  SAT - LTB 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  
Mean  
Diff 
Median 
Diff 
TAX AUDIT (%) 204 5.487 4.000  204 3.878 2.000  1.609** 2.000*** 
TAX PENALTY (%) 204 20.24 18.000  204 17.142 15.000  3.098*** 3.000*** 
TAX INSPECTOR / UNIT 170 24.398 18.000  170 21.044 16.000  3.354* 2.000* 
DEGREE INSPECTOR (%) 170 92.267 91.000  170 88.906 90.000  3.361 1.000 
EXPERIENCED INSPECTOR (%) 95 45.083 45.000  92 38.141 38.000  6.942*** 3.000*** 
TAX AUDIT and PENALTY are available from 2002 to 2007. TAX INSPECTOR/UNIT and DEGREE 
INSPECTOR are available from 2003 to 2007. EXPERIENCED INSPECTOR is available from 2005 to 2007. 
 
Panel C: During Our Sample Period: 2008-2015 
Variables SAT  LTB  SAT - LTB 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  
Mean  
Diff 
Median 
Diff 
TAX INSPECTOR / UNIT 272 22.718 16.000  272 19.867 16.000  2.851** 0.000 
DEGREE INSPECTOR (%) 238 94.729 96.000  238 94.805 95.000  -0.076 1.000* 
EXPERIENCED INSPECTOR (%) 269 47.743 47.000  268 39.336 40.000  8.407*** 7.000*** 
All variables in Panel C are available from 2008 to 2015, except for DEGREE INSPECTOR (available until 
2014). Other variables reported in Panels A and B (e.g., TAX AUDIT, TAX PENALTY) are not available 
from 2008.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median S.D. P25 P75 
FEE 1,233 13.388 13.305 0.605 13.017 13.71 
LAG 1,233 0.252 0.252 0.059 0.304 0.219 
RESTATE_FINANCIAL 1,233 0.131 0.000 0.338 0.000 0.000 
RESTATE_TAX 1,233 0.054 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.000 
INACCURATE_MAO 1,233 0.025 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.000 
PARTNERS_EXPERIENCE 1,213 70.470 70.962 22.657 54.040 92.593 
Current_ETR 1,157 0.199 0.167 0.151 0.132 0.233 
Ind_Size_ETR 1,157 -0.013 -0.036 -0.083 0.019 0.142 
SIZE 1,233 21.481 21.328 0.971 20.812 21.997 
AGE (logged) 1,233 1.522 1.609 0.501 1.099 1.946 
AGE (year) 1,233 5.173 5.000 2.530 3.000 7.000 
LEV 1,233 0.354 0.352 0.176 0.205 0.492 
ROA 1,233 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.020 0.075 
LOSS 1,233 0.061 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.000 
RECEIVABLE 1,233 0.149 0.128 0.097 0.076 0.205 
INVENTORY 1,233 0.141 0.124 0.093 0.077 0.188 
PPE 1,233 0.210 0.195 0.123 0.111 0.291 
BIGFOUR 1,233 0.033 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.000 
SEGMENT 1,233 1.378 1.099 0.610 1.099 1.946 
RETURN 1,233 0.097 -0.035 0.547 -0.233 0.266 
HSHARE 1,233 0.015 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.000 
EMPLOYEE 1,233 1.511 1.275 1.008 0.928 1.785 
MAO 1,233 0.022 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.000 
ABSDA 1,233 0.075 0.058 0.066 0.026 0.103 
TAXAGG 1,233 0.252 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 
ASSET_TO 1,233 2.101 1.824 1.297 1.249 2.537 
TACCRUAL 1,233 0.089 0.077 0.102 0.032 0.139 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: Differences between the State Authority of Taxation (SAT) and Local Tax 
Bureau (LTB)  
Variables SAT  LTB  SAT–LTB 
     Differences in 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Mean Median 
FEE 446 13.351 13.271  787 13.409 13.305  -0.058* -0.034** 
LAG 446 0.247 0.247  787 0.255 0.255  -0.007** -0.008** 
RESTATE_FINANCIAL 446 0.072 0.000  787 0.165 0.000  -0.093***  0.000*** 
RESTATE_TAX 446 0.013 0.000  787 0.078 0.000  -0.064***  0.000** 
INACCURATE_MAO 446 0.018 0.000  787 0.029 0.000  -0.011 0.000 
PARTNERS_EXPERIENCE 437 67.609 67.129  776 72.082 71.539  -4.473* -4.410** 
Current_ETR 422 0.216 0.170  735 0.189 0.165   0.028***  0.005** 
Ind_Size_ETR 422 0.000 -0.026  735 -0.021 -0.036   0.021*** 0.010* 
SIZE 446 21.433 21.252  787 21.509 21.382  -0.076 -0.130** 
AGE (logged) 446 1.418 1.386  787 1.581 1.609  -0.163*** -0.223*** 
AGE (year) 446 4.583 4.000  787 5.507 5.000  -0.924** -1.000*** 
LEV 446 0.344 0.338  787 0.361 0.360  -0.017 -0.022 
ROA 446 0.047 0.043  787 0.048 0.047  -0.001 -0.004 
LOSS 446 0.054 0.000  787 0.065 0.000  -0.011  0.000 
RECEIVABLE 446 0.157 0.132  787 0.144 0.125   0.014**  0.007 
INVENTORY 446 0.142 0.122  787 0.141 0.125   0.002 -0.003 
PPE 446 0.211 0.202  787 0.209 0.189   0.003  0.013 
BIGFOUR 446 0.029 0.000  787 0.036 0.000  -0.006  0.000 
SEGMENT 446 1.394 1.099  787 1.369 1.099   0.025  0.000 
RETURN 446 0.097 -0.043  787 0.097 -0.034   0.000 -0.009 
HSHARE 446 0.009 0.000  787 0.019 0.000  -0.010  0.000 
EMPLOYEE 446 1.479 1.139  787 1.528 1.344  -0.049 -0.205*** 
MAO 446 0.011 0.000  787 0.028 0.000  -0.017*  0.000 
ABSDA 446 0.078 0.064  787 0.072 0.055  0.006 0.009 
TAXAGG 446 0.222 0.000  787 0.269 0.000  -0.047* 0.000 
ASSET_TO 446 2.502 1.837  787 2.129 1.809  -0.077 -0.028 
TACCRUAL 446 0.086 0.075  787 0.090 0.079  -0.004 -0.004 
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Figure 1: Audit Fees around the Threshold 
 
 
 
This figure shows regression discontinuity plots with linear (top graph) and quadratic (bottom graph) 
fits. The x-axis displays the month relative to the threshold date (January 1, 2002). Positive (negative) 
values indicate the firm’s income tax is administered by SAT (LTB). The y-axis shows the mean effective 
tax rates in the respective month. 
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Table 4: Tax Enforcement and Audit Fees 
Panel A: Covariate around Threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SIZE LEV ROA LOSS RECEIVABLE 
SAT -0.101 -0.015 -0.003 0.001 0.014 
 (-0.84) (-0.70) (-0.50) (0.05) (1.24) 
      
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.093 0.040 0.018 0.125 
 
 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 INVENTORY PPE BIGFOUR SEGMENT 
SAT 0.009 -0.005 -0.000 0.023 
 (0.84) (-0.40) (-0.02) (0.35) 
     
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.205 0.054 0.061 
 
 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 RETURN HSHARE AGE EMPLOYEE 
SAT 0.001 -0.015 -0.199*** -0.016 
 (0.02) (-0.92) (-3.80) (-0.11) 
     
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
Adjusted R2 0.096 -0.004 0.196 0.059 
This panel reports test results of whether the control variables used in the regression analysis are 
balanced around the threshold. For brevity, the intercept and fixed effects are not tabulated. The t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. The superscripts ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 4: Tax Enforcement and Audit Fees 
 
Panel B: Regression on Tax Enforcement on Audit Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FEE FEE FEE 
SAT -0.084** -0.051** -0.159*** 
 (-2.45) (-2.13) (-3.59) 
SIZE  0.367*** 0.372*** 
  (15.71) (15.80) 
AGE  -0.017 -0.016 
  (-0.59) (-0.54) 
LEV  -0.122 -0.129 
  (-1.17) (-1.23) 
ROA  0.422 0.440 
  (1.17) (1.21) 
LOSS  0.574*** 0.577*** 
  (5.82) (5.76) 
RECEIVABLE  -0.035 -0.017 
  (-0.26) (-0.13) 
INVENTORY  0.283** 0.304** 
  (2.16) (2.32) 
PPE  0.008 0.001 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
BIGFOUR  0.692*** 0.693*** 
  (9.46) (9.59) 
SEGMENT  0.022 0.027 
  (1.13) (1.39) 
RETURN  0.040 0.039 
  (1.57) (1.54) 
HSHARE  -0.354** -0.356** 
  (-2.35) (-2.36) 
EMPLOYEE  0.082*** 0.082*** 
  (4.40) (4.39) 
MAO  0.015 0.030 
  (0.29) (0.56) 
ABSDA  -0.148 -0.154 
  (-0.83) (-0.86) 
TAXAGG  -0.017 -0.015 
  (-0.64) (-0.58) 
    
Linear Date Trend No No Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,153 1,153 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.642 0.643 
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This panel reports results of the effect of tax enforcement on corporate audit fees using OLS. SAT is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is administered by the State Administration of Taxation 
(i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is administered by the Local Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered 
in 2001). For brevity, the intercept and fixed effects are not tabulated. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
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Table 5: Tax Enforcement and Audit Report Lag 
 (1) (2) 
 LAG LAG 
SAT -0.008** -0.014* 
 (-2.21) (-1.73) 
SIZE 0.005 0.008** 
 (1.49) (2.21) 
LEV 0.008 -0.018 
 (0.55) (-1.13) 
ROA -0.142** -0.145** 
 (-2.54) (-2.48) 
LOSS -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.33) (0.22) 
RECEIVABLE -0.015 0.036 
 (-0.72) (1.45) 
INVENTORY 0.012 0.003 
 (0.58) (0.11) 
PPE -0.071*** -0.060*** 
 (-4.02) (-3.10) 
BIGFOUR 0.003 -0.013 
 (0.38) (-1.36) 
SEGMENT 0.005* 0.005 
 (1.91) (1.63) 
RETURN -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (-2.81) (-2.62) 
ANALYST -0.005*** -0.004** 
 (-2.73) (-2.16) 
EMPLOYEE 0.001 0.001 
 (0.54) (0.40) 
CFO -0.015 -0.017 
 (-0.52) (-0.57) 
HSHARE -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.36) 
MAO 0.009 0.012 
 (0.67) (0.91) 
Linear Date Trend No Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.126 
This table reports results of the effect of tax enforcement on audit report lag using OLS. SAT is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is administered by the State Administration of Taxation 
(i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is administered by the Local Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered 
in 2001). The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3487193
 59 
 
Table 6: Tax Enforcement and Restatements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT -0.077*** -0.219*** -0.057*** -0.128** 
 (-4.09) (-6.88) (-3.11) (-2.46) 
SIZE 0.014 0.026 0.034* 0.037* 
 (0.74) (1.33) (1.91) (1.94) 
AGE 0.034 0.022 0.012 0.009 
 (1.58) (1.02) (0.53) (0.40) 
LEV 0.283 0.257 0.294* 0.293 
 (1.39) (1.31) (1.66) (1.64) 
ROA 0.346 0.309 0.881 0.897 
 (0.66) (0.60) (1.57) (1.62) 
LOSS 0.099* 0.102* 0.067 0.070 
 (1.65) (1.75) (1.27) (1.32) 
RECEIVABLE 0.016 0.065 -0.544*** -0.540*** 
 (0.13) (0.53) (-3.44) (-3.59) 
INVENTORY -0.238* -0.171 -0.168 -0.162 
 (-1.87) (-1.35) (-1.46) (-1.47) 
PPE -0.002 -0.009 -0.455*** -0.461*** 
 (-0.02) (-0.09) (-4.07) (-4.08) 
SEGMENT -0.003 0.004 -0.019 -0.017 
 (-0.20) (0.22) (-1.28) (-1.16) 
RETURN -0.001 -0.002 -0.023 -0.022 
 (-0.06) (-0.10) (-1.55) (-1.53) 
HSHARE 0.108 0.093 0.529*** 0.519** 
 (0.74) (0.71) (2.59) (2.51) 
EMPLOYEE -0.025* -0.031** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
 (-1.77) (-2.28) (-3.53) (-3.45) 
MKT -0.002 -0.004** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (-1.27) (-2.00) (-3.43) (-3.28) 
BIGFOUR 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.016 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.19) (0.26) 
CFO -0.190 -0.185 0.298* 0.299* 
 (-1.03) (-0.99) (1.75) (1.75) 
LAG -0.017 -0.020 0.238 0.254 
 (-0.11) (-0.13) (1.47) (1.57) 
ASSET_TO -0.002 -0.005 -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (-0.18) (-0.41) (-3.76) (-3.61) 
TACCRUAL -0.356 -0.336 -0.174 -0.177 
 (-1.35) (-1.32) (-0.96) (-0.97) 
     
Linear Date Trend No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year Industry + Year Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
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Adjusted R2 0.054 0.077 0.108 0.109 
This table reports results of the effect of tax enforcement on financial or tax-related restatements using a 
linear probability model. SAT is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is administered by the 
State Administration of Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is administered by the Local 
Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered in 2001). For brevity, the intercept and fixed effects are not tabulated. The 
t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. The superscripts 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
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Table 7: Cross-sectional Analyses 
Panel A: Local SAT Office Tax Enforcement Strength 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FEE LAG RESTATE_FINANCIAL RESTATE_TAX 
SAT 0.049 -0.080 -0.001 0.006 -0.012 -0.164*** 0.046* 0.014 
 (1.15) (-1.37) (-0.11) (0.71) (-0.41) (-3.41) (1.87) (0.38) 
HIGH_SAT_ENFORCE -0.159*** -0.162*** 0.004 0.004 0.039 0.029 0.113*** 0.113*** 
 (-5.69) (-5.83) (0.95) (0.91) (1.36) (1.05) (3.35) (3.45) 
SAT×HIGH_SAT_ENFORCE -0.105** -0.101** -0.012* -0.011 -0.090** -0.082** -0.150*** -0.150*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.08) (-1.71) (-1.48) (-2.28) (-2.14) (-4.15) (-4.22) 
         
Control Variables  Included 
Linear Date Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.661 0.080 0.082 0. 201 0.239 0. 091 0.091 
This panel reports results of the interaction effect of tax enforcement at the local office level and SAT enforcement on audit fees, audit report lag, 
and tax-related restatements using OLS. HIGH_SAT_ENFORCE is an indicator equal to one if the local SAT office’s median tax audit rate and 
penalty rate from 1999 to 2007 are greater than the local LTB office’s and zero otherwise. SAT is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is 
administered by the State Administration of Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is administered by the Local Taxation Bureau 
(i.e., registered in 2001). The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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TABLE 7: Cross-sectional Analyses 
Panel B: Industry Expert Auditors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FEE LAG RESTATE_FINANCIAL RESTATE_TAX 
SAT 0.029 -0.081 0.004 0.009 0.031 -0.012 0.028 0.006 
 (0.65) (-1.58) (0.62) (1.01) (1.23) (-0.32) (1.14) (0.25) 
INDUSTRY_EXPERT 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.009 0.009* 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.028 0.027 
 (3.03) (2.87) (1.63) (1.70) (3.39) (3.30) (1.58) (1.55) 
SAT×INDUSTRY_EXPERT -0.107** -0.125** -0.016** -0.014* -0.112*** -0.123*** -0.052** -0.054** 
 (-2.12) (-2.40) (-2.03) (-1.73) (-3.64) (-3.73) (-2.02) (-2.01) 
         
Control Variables  Included 
Linear Date Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
Adjusted R2 0.638 0.640 0.082 0.083 0.092 0.092 0.012 0.013 
This panel reports results of the interaction effect of audit firm and SAT enforcement on audit fees, audit report lag, and tax-related restatements 
using OLS. INDUSTRY_EXPERT is an indicator equal to one if the audit firm is an expert in the client’s industry, and zero otherwise. We identify 
industry audit specialist following the approach of Audousset-Coulier et al. (2015). Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions. SAT is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is administered by the State Administration of Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it 
is administered by the Local Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered in 2001). The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm-year level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
Panel A1: Placebo Test—Assumed Policy One Year Ahead 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FEE LAG 
RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT_PLACEBO1 0.055 0.001 0.047 0.061 
 (1.35) (0.38) (0.79) (0.84) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1411 1411 1411 1411 
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.090 0.068 0.094 
This panel reports the placebo test results of the effect of tax enforcement on our interested variables 
using a hypothetical policy year of 2001, or one year before the actual policy year. 
Panel A2: Placebo Test—Assumed Policy One Year After 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FEE LAG 
RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT_PLACEBO2 0.012 0.004 0.104 -0.008 
 (0.49) (0.79) (0.26) (-1.34) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 790 790 790 790 
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.061 0.065 0.098 
This panel reports the placebo test results of the effect of tax enforcement on our interested variables 
using a hypothetical policy year of 2003, or one year after the actual policy year. 
 
Panel A3 Placebo Test—Unaffected Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
FEE LAG RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
SAT  -0.096 0.003 -0.009 
 (-0.46) (0.34) (-0.64) 
    
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 281 281 281 
Adjusted R2 0.815 0.144 0.359 
This panel reports the placebo test results of the effect of tax enforcement on our interested variables 
using firms that were not affected by the policy (i.e., firms registered in Shanghai or central SOEs). Note 
that there is no tax-related restatement (RESTATE_TAX) in this unaffected firm sample. 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
Panel B: Sensitivity Test—Narrowed Time Window around the Threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 18-Month Window  
(4/2001–9/2002) 
 
FEE LAG RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT  -0.096*** -0.009** -0.136*** -0.075*** 
 (-3.42) (-2.02) (-6.27) (-2.71) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 916 916 916 916 
Adjusted R2 0.659 0.071 0.104 0.103 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 12-Month Window  
(7/2001–6/2002) 
 
FEE LAG RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT -0.142*** -0.013** -0.204*** -0.132*** 
 (-4.90) (-2.36) (-7.43) (-2.76) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 624 624 624 624 
Adjusted R2 0.686 0.131 0.133 0.144 
This panel reports the results of the effect of tax enforcement using narrower windows around the 
threshold, focusing on firms that were newly registered closer to the policy cut-off date. In the main 
analysis, a 24-month window (1/2001–12/2002) is used. 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
Panel C1: Matched Sample using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Covariate balance after PSM 
Control 
Variables 
SAT  LTB  SAT – LTB 
N Mean  N Mean  Mean Diff 
SIZE 415 21.394  415 21.433  -0.039 
LEV 415 0.327  415 0.343  -0.017 
ROA 415 0.050  415 0.045  0.005 
LOSS 415 0.048  415 0.058  -0.010 
RECEIVABLE 415 0.158  415 0.157  0.001 
INVENTORY 415 0.136  415 0.140  -0.005 
PPE 415 0.209  415 0.212  -0.003 
BIGFOUR 415 0.022  415 0.022  0.000 
SEGMENT 415 1.397  415 1.391  0.006 
RETURN 415 0.105  415 0.096  0.009 
HSHARE 415 0.005  415 0.010  -0.005 
EMPLOYEE 415 1.409  415 1.469  -0.060 
AGE 415 1.415  415 1.434  -0.020 
 
Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FEE LAG 
RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT -0.059** -0.008** -0.072*** -0.042** 
 (-2.43) (-2.04) (-3.34) (-2.23) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 830 830 830 830 
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.079 0.080 0.045 
This panel reports the results of matched sample analysis for the effect of tax enforcement on our 
interested variables by using PSM. We first use a logit regression to estimate the probability of being a 
SAT firm. The variables we include in the logit regression are covariate below, year and industry fixed 
effects. We then create the matched sample using the 1:1 nearest neighbor matching technique without 
replacement and a caliper set at 0.03 following Shipman et al. (2017).  
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
Panel C2: Matched Sample using Entropy Balance Matching 
Covariate balance after Entropy Balancing Matching 
 SAT  LTB  SAT – LTB 
Control Variables Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Diff 
SIZE 21.430 0.845  21.430 0.867  0.000 
LEV 0.344 0.032  0.344 0.029  0.000 
ROA 0.047 0.002  0.047 0.002  0.000 
LOSS 0.054 0.051  0.054 0.051  0.000 
RECEIVABLE 0.157 0.010  0.157 0.010  0.000 
INVENTORY 0.143 0.009  0.143 0.008  0.000 
PPE 0.212 0.013  0.212 0.017  0.000 
BIGFOUR 0.029 0.028  0.029 0.028  0.000 
SEGMENT 1.394 0.331  1.394 0.404  0.000 
RETURN 0.097 0.281  0.097 0.303  0.000 
HSHARE 0.009 0.009  0.009 0.009  0.000 
EMPLOYEE 1.479 1.364  1.479 0.771  0.000 
AGE 1.418 0.214  1.418 0.268  0.000 
 
Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FEE LAG 
RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT -0.058** -0.009** -0.068*** -0.057*** 
 (-2.51) (-2.53) (-3.60) (-3.47) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 
R2 0.627 0.104 0.098 0.098 
This panel reports the results of Entropy Balancing matched sample analysis for the effect of tax 
enforcement on our interested variables. Control firms (LTB) are reweighted to achieve the covariant 
balance (the first moment adjustment) via Entropy Balancing following Hainmueller (2012). 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
Panel D: Sensitivity Test—Extended Sample Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
FEE LAG RESTATE_ 
FINANCIAL 
RESTATE_ 
TAX 
SAT -0.048** -0.008** -0.052*** -0.058*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.30) (-2.59) (-3.14) 
     
Control Variables  Included 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year 
N 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.085 0.057 0.106 
This panel reports the results of the effect of tax enforcement on our interested variables using an 
extended sample that begins in 2005, the earliest year possible for the newly registered firms in 2002 to 
become publicly listed companies. 
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Table 9 Additional Analyses: Tax Enforcement and Audit Reporting 
 (1) (2) 
 INACCUR_MAO INACCUR_MAO 
SAT -0.949* 0.508 
 (-1.92) (0.46) 
SIZE 0.472 0.482 
 (1.27) (1.30) 
LEV -0.837 -0.503 
 (-0.25) (-0.14) 
ROA -7.926 -6.939 
 (-1.07) (-0.84) 
LOSS 1.236 1.328 
 (1.27) (1.28) 
RECEIVABLE -10.752*** -11.552*** 
 (-3.55) (-3.89) 
INVENTORY 0.869 1.048 
 (0.30) (0.42) 
PPE -0.543 -0.060 
 (-0.32) (-0.04) 
SEGMENT -0.720* -0.677* 
 (-1.93) (-1.89) 
RETURN 0.588* 0.647* 
 (1.73) (1.90) 
HSHARE -0.992 0.161 
 (-0.58) (0.09) 
ANALST -0.843*** -0.868*** 
 (-3.61) (-3.87) 
EMPLOYEE -0.683 -0.633 
 (-0.89) (-0.93) 
MKT -0.038 -0.004 
 (-1.12) (-0.10) 
BIGFOUR 2.083 1.786 
 (1.05) (0.84) 
CFO -4.044 -3.734 
 (-1.19) (-1.17) 
LAG 4.349 4.429 
 (0.77) (0.82) 
   
Linear Date Trend  No Yes  
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year 
N 1,128 1,128 
Pseudo R2 0.304 0.329 
This table reports results of the effect of tax enforcement on the accuracy of audit opinion using logit 
estimation. SAT is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is administered by the State 
Administration of Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is administered by the Local 
Taxation Bureau (i.e., registered in 2001). The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm-year level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
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Table 10 Additional Analyses: Tax Enforcement and Audit Partners’ Assignments 
 (1) (2) 
 
PARTNERS_ 
EXPERIENCE 
PARTNERS_ 
EXPERIENCE 
SAT -2.705* -6.738** 
 (-1.89) (-2.25) 
SIZE 1.777 1.885 
 (1.35) (1.43) 
LEV -7.669 -7.830 
 (-1.38) (-1.39) 
ROA 66.337*** 67.197*** 
 (3.28) (3.31) 
LOSS 5.629* 5.961* 
 (1.80) (1.90) 
RECEIVABLE 4.186 3.268 
 (0.50) (0.39) 
INVENTORY 7.088 6.029 
 (0.87) (0.73) 
PPE 1.817 1.046 
 (0.26) (0.15) 
BIG FOUR -12.901*** -12.650*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.64) 
SEGMENT -1.424 -1.290 
 (-1.31) (-1.18) 
RETURN 0.413 0.401 
 (0.34) (0.33) 
HSHARE 1.358 0.728 
 (0.31) (0.17) 
ANALYST -1.201 -1.292* 
 (-1.56) (-1.68) 
EMPLOYEE 0.858 0.976 
 (0.98) (1.12) 
   
Linear Date Trend No Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry + Year Industry + Year 
N 1,213 1,213 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.058 
This table reports the results of the effect of tax enforcement on auditor partners’ assignment using OLS. 
SAT is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s income tax is administered by the State Administration of 
Taxation (i.e., those registered in 2002) and zero if it is administered by the Local Taxation Bureau (i.e., 
registered in 2001). The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-year 
level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-
tailed tests, respectively. 
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